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INTRODUCTION 
The understanding and measurement of human Intelligence has been, and 
continues to be one of the most controversial fields of testing. 
Continued dissatisfaction with the psychometric approach to intelligence 
along with a renewed consideration of the wide range of human abilities 
and their everyday manifestations, has led to recent calls to move 
'beyond 10' and 'broaden the base of Intellectual assessment' (Felcknan, 
1980; Gardner, 1983; Sternberg, 1985). Sternberg's trlarchic theory of 
human intelligence is an Important step in this direction. Although all 
three subtheories of the trlarchic theory are relevant to the evaluation 
or assessment of intelligence, the experiential subtheory, according to 
which intelligence comprises in large part the ability to adapt to novel 
tasks and situations, is of particular Interest here. Measurement 
attempts, as they apply to coping with novel experiences, have revolved 
primarily around the measurement of insight skills. Preliminary research 
results with adults and school-aged children seem to show that insight 
skills do differentiate the more from the less intelligent, provide a 
useful way of understanding a critical aspect of Intellectual glftedness, 
and seem to be trainable (Davidson, 1966; Davidson & Sternberg, 1984). 
The question remains though whether or not such differentiation and 
tralnability would apply to young children. 
The primary purpose of the present study was to examine the role of 
insight skills in individual differences in intelligence in young 
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children. In addition, the study Investigates the effects of cues and 
gender on insightful performance. The understanding of the role of 
Insight skills In Intelligent performance may not only provide an 
Important supplement to alternative psychometric and Information 
processing approaches to the understanding and assessment of Individual 
differences In Intelligence, but may also have Important practical 
Implications for the development of curricula at primary school levels. 
Review of the Literature 
Intelligence 
Intelligence has been a heavily researched psychological construct, 
and several different conceptions and paradigms, including the learning, 
the psychometric, the Plagetian and the information-processing, have been 
proposed In an attempt to understand and assess intelligent behavior. 
One of the most influential conceptions of the nature of intelligence has 
been elaborated in the psychometric approach, which has sought to 
understand intelligence in terms of latent sources of individual 
differences or "factors." Most of the early efforts were based on the 
view that Intelligence was a more or less unitary trait. Blnet (Binet & 
Simon, 1905) regarded Intelligence as a synthesis or a composite of the 
different faculties of Judgement, practical sense, initiative, and the 
ability to adapt oneself to one's circumstances. He developed a scale, 
guided by pragmatic considerations, to test a child on a variety of 
cognitive activities and struck an average to serve as an index of 
all-round adaptive adequacy, and as a basis for predicting success in 
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school. Spearman (1927) proposed a theory of mental organization based 
upon a statistical analysis of the Intercorrelatlons among children's 
test scores. Observing that all his measures were positively 
Intercorrelated, Spearman concluded that Intelligence comprises primarily 
a single underlying mental dimension that permeates performance on all 
Intellectual tasks. Antagonistic to Spearman's theory were those of 
Thurstone (1938) and more recently Guilford (1967). These factor 
analysts rejected the unldlmenslonal model of Intelligence in favor of a 
multiple factor theory. Thurstone (1936) rejected Spearman's 'g' in 
favor of a number of broad group factors, and proposed that Intelligence 
comprises roughly seven primary mental abilities, namely verbal 
comprehension, numerical ability, memory, reasoning, spatial 
visualization, word fluency and perceptual speed. Guilford (1967) went a 
step further and developed an elaborate three-dimensional "structure of 
Intellect" model. The model postulated five different kinds of mental 
operations (cognition, memory, divergent thinking, convergent thinking, 
and evaluation), four types of content (figurai, symbolic, semantic, and 
behavioral), and six products (units, classes, relations, systems, 
transformations and implications). The model thus results in at least 
120 distinct factors, each of which involves the action of some operation 
upon some content to produce some product. Factor analytic procedures 
have continued to multiply and have led to the development of a multitude 
of tests of Intelligence. Although the psychometric theories and tests 
of Intelligence have made a substantial contribution to our current 
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understanding of human Intellectual functioning, they have come under 
considerable criticism. 
Skeptics claim that the typical psychometric model of human 
Intelligence Is limited because the kinds of tasks used In such tests are 
of dubltable ecological validity; that Is, the data base falls to take 
account of the many manifestations of Intelligent behavior In the 
everyday world (Frederlksen, 1986; Sternberg, 1985). Global 
Intelligence test scores have also been criticized for not being able to 
provide researchers of Intelligence with an understanding of the 
cognitive mechanisms or processes that underlie or mediate Intelligent 
functioning. This concern with Internal processes led to a shift in 
research towards testing Information processing conceptions of 
intelligence. Information processing researchers use techniques such as 
computer simulation (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958), and mathematical 
modelling based on reaction-time data (Sternberg, 1969) to discover 
strategies of information processing in tasks requiring the exercise of 
one's intelligence. Such research, however, has resulted in a large 
number of task specific and frequently subject specific models, which 
made it impossible to draw any generalizations from them. The past 
decade has brought an increasing convergence of research from the 
psychometric and information processing traditions (Carroll, 1974; 
Cronbach, 1975; Hunt, Lunneborg & Lewis, 1975; Pellegrino & Glaser, 1979; 
Sternberg, 1977b, 1981). In both fields, however, the domain of 
intelligence has tended to be academic (Nelsser, 1967). More recently, 
theorists have begun to reconceptualize the construct of intelligence and 
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have attempted to formulate new, more integrative and ecologically valid 
theories that take into account a broader spectrum of individual 
behaviors (Gardner, 1963; Feldnan, 1980; Frederlksen, 1986; Sternberg, 
1985). 
Sternberg (1985) has recently proposed a trlarchic theory of human 
intelligence In an attempt to link information processing ideas with 
psychometric approaches in the investigation of intelligent behavior, and 
to understand intelligence in a broad, pluralistic way. According to the 
trlarchic model, intelligence must be understood in tepms of the internal 
and external worlds of the individual and the interface between these two 
worlds as it unfolds through experience. The trlarchic theory Is based 
on three subtheories of Intelligence: the componentlal, the contextual 
and the experiential. 
The componentlal subtheory relates intelligence to the internal world 
of the individual, and deals with the mental mechanisms by which 
intelligent behavior is accomplished. This subtheory specifies three 
kinds of processes that are critical to intelligent behavior: 
metacomponents, which are used in the planning, monitoring, and 
evaluating of task performance; performance components, which are used in 
actually performing the tasks one faces; and knowledge-acquisition 
components, which are used in learning how to perform tasks. This 
subtheory attempts to specify the Internal processes underlying the 
behaviors one engages in so as to attain a fit with the environment. 
The contextual subtheory relates intelligence to the external world 
of the individual, and views intelligence as mental activity directed 
toward purposive adaptation to, and selection and shaping of environments 
In attaining a fit to the environmental contexts In which one lives. For 
Instance, If a partner In a marriage is unhappy In the marriage, and 
adaptation to the present environment Is difficult, the Individual may 
attempt to select an alternative environment by possibly leaving the 
marriage, or may attempt to reshape the environment by trying to 
restructure the marriage to increase the fit between himself/herself and 
the envlrcmment. This subtheory specifies the kinds of behavioral 
contents that are appropriate for understanding and measuring 
intelligence within a given soclocultural setting. 
The experiential subtheory relates intelligence to both the external 
and internal worlds, and specifies those points along the continuum of 
one's experience with tasks or situations that most critically Involve 
the use of Intelligence. In particular, this account emphasizes the 
roles of novelty and of automatization in exceptional intelligence. 
According to the triarchlc theory, "intelligence Is the mental capability 
of emitting contextually appropriate behavior at those regions in the 
experiential continuum that involve response to novelty or automatization 
of information-processing as a function of metaconponents, performance 
components, and knowledge acquisition components' (Sternberg, 1965, p. 
128). 
The three subtheorles are at different stages of empirical 
verification. While the componential subtheory has been empirically 
tested in some detail (Sternberg, 1977a, 1977b; Sternberg & Gardner, 
1983; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980; Sternberg & Rlfkin, 1979), the contextual 
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subtheory has received only the most minimal empirical verification 
(Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). 
Within the experiential subtheory, only the part of the subtheory dealing 
with task novelty has received any test (Davidson, 1986; Davidson & 
Sternberg, 1984; Sternberg, 1981, 1982; Sternberg & Davidson, 1982, 
1983). Attempts to measure Individuals' skills In dealing with novel 
tasks have Involved the use of two different paradigms of research and 
measurement. One paradigm has Involved novelty In task eomprehenalon. 
which refers to the novelty that Inheres In learning how to do the task . 
rather than In actually doing it. For example, the subject might be 
given a verbal description of the state of an object In 1980, a physical 
description of the state of that object In 2000, and then be asked to 
choose the correct verbal description that characterizes the object In 
2000, according to a certain set of rules. The other paradigm has 
Involved novelty primarily In task solution, which refers to novelty in 
acting on a problem rather than in learning about the problem. It is the 
latter paradigm, that has used Insight problems as an Index of the 
ability to deal with task novelty and, thus, of Intelligence, that forms 
the focal concern of the present research effort. 
Ingjqht skil ls  
Most research and discussion on problem solving has been strongly 
Influenced by the theoretical assumptions and orientations of the 
Investigators. Despite the theoretical diversity, most psychologists 
agree that a problem usually refers to a situation In which an Individual 
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Is called upon to perform a task not previously encountered, and for 
which externally provided Instructions do not specify completely the mode 
of solution. The particular task, In other words, Is new for the 
Individual, although processes or knowledge already available can be 
called upon for solution. A wide variety of tasks and problem situations 
such as puzzles, anagrams, mathematical problems, and everyday personal, 
scientific and organizational problems have been used In the 
Investigation of the psychological processes Involved In problem solving. 
Problems In which the solution may be found by discovering or perceiving 
a pattern of relationships or a principle, rather than by blind 
trlal-and-error or simple association, elicit insightful behavior, and 
are generally referred to as insight problems. In a typical insight 
problem, for instance, a subject may be presented with a simple 
arrangement of matches that form five connected squares, and asked to 
produce an arrangement of four squares by moving three matches; or the 
subject might be given some assorted materials and asked to attach a 
candle to the wall, which Involves perceiving a box of thumbtacks as a 
candle holder. Such insightful solutions do involve some amount of 
originality, flexibility and fluency, which are cognitive processes 
called upon in creativity tasks (Guilford, 1967). What distinguishes 
insight tasks from creative problem-solving situations, however, is that 
the latter have no objectively ascertainable correct solution. In a 
creative task, for example, the subject may be presented with a brief 
story plot and asked to Invent titles for it. 
9 
Classical Gestalt theorists argue that mental processes and events 
are too rich and creative and Intricately organized to be characterized 
solely in terms of associative and mechanical thinking, and emphasize the 
phenomena of insight, discovery and understanding (Kohler, 1927; Duncker, 
1945; Naler, 1930; Wertheimer, 1959). Insight is postulated to involve 
the processes of organization and reorganization in which past experience 
and available resources in the situation are integrated to achieve 
understanding and produce the insightful solution. This change in the 
meaning and in the perceptual organization of the elements in the problem 
situation is what provides us with a Jolt and is called insight (Ellen, 
1982). Thus, from the Gestalt perspective, Insight problems require 
abilities that are special and different from the abilities required in 
solving more conventional problems, and mere experience in problem 
solving is not sufficient to account for creative and insightful problem 
solving. Moreover, the source of difficulty in such problems is believed 
to lie in the Interference of habit with flexibilty, In functional 
fixedness and in a mental set which may have been established by previous 
experience but may be inappropriate to a particular situation. 
In an attempt to empirically demonstrate the Gestalt principles, 
several studies have been conducted using insight tasks. Burke and Maier 
(1965) presented 275 male college students with the hatrack problem. The 
hatrack problem requires experimental subjects to construct a hatrack out 
of two poles of unequal length and a C-clamp. Performance on this 
Insight problem was found to be unrelated to subjects' scores on various 
measures of Intellectual ability, which led the authors to conclude that 
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the solution of Inslggit problems requires abilities that are different 
from those required for more traditional problems. They also reported 
that increased time for search did not Increase the number of correct 
solutions produced, which suggested that subjects were not operating on a 
blind or trial-and-error basis. In another study (Maler & Casselman, 
1970a>, the relationship between the mental operations involved in 
insight problems and SAT scores was examined using 264 males and 210 
female college students. It was found that the SAT (math) scores were 
correlated with ability on insight problems for both sexes, while the SAT 
(verbal) scores showed little correlation for either sex. It was also 
found that males solved significantly more problems than females. Duncan 
(1961) reported a number of experiments in which three different types of 
nonspecific training were used in an attempt to influence performance on 
Maier's two-string problem (Maler, 1933). Results indicated that none of 
the prior training sessions had a significant effect on the probability 
or time of solution of the problem. 
Later Gestalt psychologists concerned themselves more with phenomena 
observed to have a restricting effect on the production of an acceptable 
solution, and with the function of hints in problem solving (Burke, Maler 
& Hoffman, 1966; Maler & Casselman, 1970b; Maler & Janzen, 1968). 
Several Gestalt oriented psychologists demonstrated that past experience 
could serve either as an aid or a dlstractor in problem solution, and 
that the effectiveness of a hint depends on the direction In thinking and 
on whether or not this direction is congruent with the perceived 
difficulty in the problem. Maler and Casselman (1970b) designed a study 
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to determine the effect of manipulation of a major obstacle In six 
insight problems. They reported that single hints failed to provide 
significant improvement since the location of a problem's difficulty 
appeared to vary for different individuals. Moreover, the obstacles 
perceived to be difficult by females differed from those perceived as 
difficult by males. They also found that hints or suggestions worked as 
distractions to an individual attempting to discover the solution. Maler 
and Janzen (1968> investigated the functional values of objects in 
problem solving, and found that past experience with the experimental 
objects Inhibited innovative solutions to the problem. Another study 
(Wicker, Weinstein, Yelich & Brooks, 1978) investigated the effects of 
two different types of instructions on solution of insight problems. 
Results indicated that instructions that emphasized reformulation of the 
initial view of the problem rather than visualization of the problem 
components Improved proficiency with insight problems. 
Although the Gestalt approach has exerted a potent Influence on the 
study of problem solving and helped lay the foundations for later 
approaches to the investigation of cognitive processes and their 
components, it has also created controversy and provoked opposition. 
Critics have claimed that the constructs under investigation were 
ill-defined and Inaccessible to empirical study. According to modern 
theorists (Domlnowskl, 1981; Jacobs & Dominowski, 1981; Welsberg & Alba, 
1981, 1982), the Gestalt ideas of insight and of fixation are neither 
necessary nor useful in accounting for problem solving behavior. Their 
view of problem solving emphasizes the idea that insight is merely an 
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extension of ordinary processes of perceiving, recognizing, learning and 
conceiving, and that a rather straightforward application of past 
experience Is sufficient to account for the appearance of Insightful 
solutions. Welsberg and Alba (1981) conducted an experiment In which 100 
college students were presented several classical Insight problems 
Including the nine dot problem. In the nine dot problem, subjects are 
given a 3 X 3 array of 9 equally spaced dots and asked to connect the 
dots with 4 straight lines without lifting the pencil from the paper. 
The researchers found that even after the subjects had been given the 
Insight that the problem could only be solved by extending the lines 
outside the boundaries of the square formed by the dots, and had been 
deflxated, the subjects still had considerable difficulty solving the 
Insight problem. They also found that the frequency of solutions In the 
nine dot problem Increased when the subjects received training In solving 
similar problems. Welsberg and Alba Interpreted their results as 
suggesting that Insight problems probably Just measure problem-specific 
prior knowledge. OeVlsta and Walls (1967) also reported that giving 
subjects experience with the specific unusual use of an object required 
for solution did Increase the probability that the critical object would 
be used to solve the subsequent problem. In another study (Jacobs & 
Octnlnowskl, 1961), 28 male and 28 female college students were 
administered seven Insight problems. Results showed that general 
transfer effects occurred when sufficient practice was given, and that 
males solved more quickly than females. 
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The approach of modern theorists, such as Weisberg (1980) has been 
criticized for not facilitating our understanding of the problem-solving 
process since it is concerned primarily with defending a theoretical 
predilection rather than specifying and exploring major differences in 
process (Ellen, 1982). Modern cognitive psychology has also been accused 
of largely ignoring the phenomena involved in achieving an understanding 
of a problem domain (Wertheimer, 1985) and in the processes that generate 
genuinely productive thinking (Wertheimer, 1985). 
More recently, some researchers (Davidson & Sternberg, 1984; 
Sternberg & Davidson, 1982, 1983) have developed an 
information-processing conception of insight; they suggest that one of 
the major reasons why previous efforts to isolate insight have failed is 
because insight Involves not one process but rather three separate though 
related cognitive processes, that when performed in novel and imaginative 
ways, form a particularly important part of insightful behavior 
(Davidson, 1986; Sternberg, 1985). The first kind of Insight, selective 
encoding. Involves sifting out those elements of a problem that are 
relevant for task solution from those that are not. Fleming's discovery 
of penicillin has been cited as an example of a selective encoding 
insight, in that he recognized that the mold that had ruined his 
experiment had done so by killing off the bacteria in a petri dish. The 
second kind of insight, selective combination, involves figuring out how 
to combine selectively encoded information bits. Such information bits 
can typically be combined in many ways, only one of which is optimal. 
Darwin's formulation of the theory of evolution is viewed as having 
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Involved primarily an Insight of selective combination. Darwin had to 
recognize how the multitudinous facts he and others had collected about 
species could be combined to form a coherent theory. The third kind of 
Insight, selective comparison, Involves discovering of a nonobvlous 
relationship between new Information and information acquired In the 
past. Kekule's discovery of the structure of the benzene ring Is 
considered a famous example of a selective comparison Insight. His 
discovery hinged on his recognition that a dream he had had of a snake 
reaching back and biting Its tall was a metaphor for the geometric 
structure of the ring. 
There Is, then, more than one cognitive process that forms the basis 
of Insightful performance. Sternberg (1985) has tried to establish the 
Importance of Inslfl^t as an important avenue to the study of intelligence 
by showing that most of the major contributions to civilization, as well 
as many of the minor ones have involved insights of greater or lesser 
degree. This view is shared by De Bono (1969) who argues that several 
important concepts and principles, like the Archimedes principle and 
Newton's law of gravity, have been discovered through the famous 'aha' 
insightful experience. 
Some research, using these Information processing notions, has been 
carried out on Insightful thinking in adults and school aged children. 
In a preliminary study, 18 New Haven area adults were tested on 
mathematical word problems (of the kind found In puzzle books) requiring 
various mixtures of the three kinds of insight (Sternberg & Davidson, 
1982). Results from this research indicated, among other things, that 
s 
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the ability to apply all three kinds of Insight was highly correlated 
with scores on a general Intelligence test (roughly at the level of .6), 
and that hlgher-lQ subjects were slower, not faster than lower-IQ 
subjects In analyzing the problems and applying the Insights. 
A subsequent set of studies (Davidson, 1986; Davidson & Sternberg, 
1964) examined each of the three Insight processes In depth, and looked 
at the contribution of each of these processes to Individual differences 
In Intelligence. To better monitor the relationship between insight 
skills and Intelligence, 86 fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-grade children who 
had been identified as either gifted or nonglfted were selected to serve 
as subjects for this study. Three experiments were performed examining 
the nature of selective encoding, selective combination, and selective 
comparison, using both verbal and mathematical problems. In each 
experiment, the children received a set of insight problems examining one 
of the Insight processes, either in the standard format or with precueing 
intended to facilitate problem solution. 
The results from all three experiments showed that highly Intelligent 
children performed better than less intelligent children on mathematical 
and verbal problems; performance on the mathematical insight problems 
was highly correlated with performance on the verbal insight problems; 
performance on both types of problems was highly correlated with 
performance on standard measures of intellectual ability; performance on 
the cued problems was superior to performance on the noncued problems; 
and, the highly intelligent children tended to have the insights 
spontaneously and, hence, profited little from cueing of the insights, 
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while the children of average intelligence had difficulty producing the 
required insights and benefited from being given cues. Results also 
showed that insight skills may be trainable. 
In a five-week training program for both gifted and non-gifted 
children, the investigators were able to effect a significant improvement 
in the children's scores, relative to the scores of an untrained control 
group. Moreover, these gains were reportedly evident a year later, and 
transferred to solving problems of a kind that had not appeared in the 
training program. Thus, it appears that the study of the insight skills 
of selective encoding, selective combination and selective comparison 
provides an important approach to the understanding and assessment of 
individual differences in intelligence. This approach also extends 
previous approaches by avoiding the extreme emphasis on the aspect of 
speed of processing of many psychometric and information processing 
assessments of intellectual abilities, and by being based on items that 
do not make heavy demands upon prior knowledge (Davidson, 1986; 
Sternberg, 1982). 
Research on these Insight skills thus far has been limited to adults 
and older children. The present study hence attempts to develop insight 
problems suitable for younger children, and to empirically test the 
applicability of Sternberg's theory to young children by examining the 
relationship between insight skills and intellectual ability. On the 
basis of reviewed empirical evidence, it was predicted that more 
intelligent children would perform better on insight tasks than less 
intelligent children; that the more intelligent children would be able to 
solve more problems spontaneously than the less Intelligent children; and 
that cueing of the Insights would be more effective In facilitating 
problem solution for the less intelligent children than for the more 
intelligent children. Sex differences in performance on insight tasks 
were also examined, although no predictions were made since no clear 
trends can be found in the literature. Sex differences in children have 
not been previously explored. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects included 107 children (50 males and 57 females), who 
ranged In age from 71 to 99 months (U • 82.5 months, gfi = 6.8). Of the 
107 children, 103 were White, 3 were Asian, and 1 was Black. These 
children were enrolled In grades kindergarten through second and were 
recruited from a sumner recreational program for school-aged children and 
from private elementary schools in Ames and In Waterloo, Iowa. All the 
children had primarily middle-class socioeconomic backgrounds, and spoke 
English as their dominant language. 
Measures 
Inaiflht probiwag 
The range of problems reported In the literature and considered to be 
insightful is wide (Davidson & Sternberg, 1984; Duncan, 1961; Maier, 
1930; Scheerer, 1963; Weisberg & Alba, 1981; Wertheimer, 1959). These 
problems, however tend to be difficult, requiring fairly complex mental 
manipulations more suited to adults and older children. A series of 
tasks appropriate for young children had hence to be developed by the 
Investigator for the present study. The selection of the insight tasks 
was dictated by several considerations. Tasks were required that seemed 
likely to reflect Sternberg's conception of insight and involved one of 
the three insightful processes of selective encoding, selective 
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combination and selective comparison. In addition, tasks that would not 
make heavy demands on prior knowledge and school taught skills were 
desired (Sternberg, 1985). Moreover, the tasks needed to be novel 
without being totally outside the realm of the Individual's past 
experience (Raahelm, 1974; Sternberg, 1985). The selection and nature of 
the tasks was also guided by more practical considerations. The tasks 
needed to be concrete and enactlve in nature to facilitate optimal test 
performance. The tasks had to Include Items that were simple enough to 
be solved by at least seme of the younger six-year-olds and difficult 
enough to challenge some of the brighter seven- and eight-year-olds. 
Descriptions of 28 such Insight tasks were evaluated and Judged as being 
appropriate measures of each of the three kinds of Insist by J. E. 
Davidson (personal communication, March 20, 1987). 
Seventeen Insight tasks were then selected for the present research, 
six of which emphasized the selective encoding process, while eight 
emphasized the selective combination process and three emphasized the 
selective comparison process. The nature of each of these tasks is 
summarized below. In later sections, the individual tasks will be 
referred to by the short descriptive labels that appear in parentheses. 
Selective encoding tasks These problems involve insights that 
require the sifting of relevant information from irrelevant information 
for problem solution. 
The first task (chipmunk-acorn) uses a felt board with felt figures 
of a girl, a chipmunk, a tree, a bird, leaves, flowers, acorns, stones 
and a box. A short story is told about this girl who goes out into the 
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woods and notices the various items (Just described) in the woods and 
decides to take the chipmunk, a stone and an acorn heme. She keeps them 
in her box, closes it, and carries It carefully home, but finds one of 
the Items missing from her box upon reaching home. The task is to figure 
out which one of the items is missing from her box. 
The second task (squares-In-grid) consists of a 4 1/2 x 4 1/2 in.(11 
1/2 x 11 1/2 cm) square, made up of a grid of nine squares of equal size, 
drawn on a piece of yellow poster board. The task is to find the total 
number of squares in the figure. 
The third task (bald-grandpa) consists of a short story. The subject 
Is told that a grandpa goes out for a walk one day and gets caught in the 
rain without a hat or an umbrella, and that his clothes get completely 
wet but that he does not get any wet hair on his head. The task Is to 
figure out how this could have been possible. 
The fourth task (block-ln-bottle) consists of a narrow necked glass 
bottle with a small wood block Inside, along with a pitcher full of 
water, a piece of string, a pair of short tweezers, a pipe cleaner, a 
twist tie and a popslcle stick, all arranged on a tray. The task Is to 
select (from the array of displayed items) the item that would help 
retrieve the block from the bottle without lifting the bottle from the 
tray. 
The fifth task (driver-of-car) consists of a small red and white car 
that has two girls (in green and blue dresses), a boy (In white shirt and 
green pants) and a dog riding In It. The driver's seat Is left empty. 
The subject Is told that he/she is the driver of the car and Is taking 
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the children out for a ride to the zoo. The clothes of all the riders 
are described and the subject's task Is to describe what the driver of 
the car Is wearing. 
The sixth task (candy-balloon) consists of a poster board with an 
array of nine candies displayed at the top, followed by a piece each of 
three different types of candy, each of which is alligned with one, two 
or three balloons. The subjects are briefed about the nine available 
candies and the trade value of each of the three seperately displayed 
candies (gum, chocolate and tangy candy) in terms of balloons. Given 
that each piece of gum could be traded In for two balloons, the subject's 
task is to figure out the trade value of two pieces of gum. 
Selective combination tasks These problems Involve insights that 
require the combination of relevant information in a meaningful way to 
allow problem solution. 
The first task (ship-puzzle) consists of a picture of scrambled 
puzzle pieces of a sailboat/ship on an 8 1/2 x 11 in. (22 x 28 cm) sheet 
of blue paper. The task is to mentally unscramble the picture and guess 
what picture the puzzle pieces make when fit together. 
The second task (alternate-glasses) consists of a tray with six 
glasses arranged in a straight line: three glasses filled with colored 
water and three empty glasses. The task Is to line up these glasses so 
that every other glass is full and every other glass is empty by moving 
only one glass. 
The third task (snack-table) consists of a small wood table, four 
chairs and four figures of children (two boys and two girls) labelled A, 
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B, C, and 0 (arranged alphabetically). The task la to find the right 
seating arrangement, given certain constraints on which child would or 
would not like to be seated next to which child. 
The fourth task (pointing-blocks) consists of six red wooden 
inch-cubes arranged in a triangular pattern on a piece of poster board. 
The task is to make the pattern point in the opposite direction by moving 
only two blocks. 
The fifth task (crackers) consists of five round crackers placed In a 
straight line on a white rectangular styrofoam board. The task is to 
find a way to arrange the five crackers in two straight lines so that 
there are three crackers in each line. 
The sixth task (cat-rabblt-carrots) consists of a flannel board with 
figures of a boy, a cat, a rabbit, a bunch of carrots and a house. In 
this problem, the boy has to carry his pet animals and the carrots into 
his house but can only carry them in one at a time. The cat cannot be 
left alone with the rabbit, and the rabbit cannot be left alone with the 
carrots (figures of these prohibited combinations with big slashes across 
them are placed at the top of the board). The task is to think of a way 
to bring the cat, the rabbit and the bag of carrots (in tact) one at a 
time into the house. 
The seventh task (lion-puzzle) consists of a picture of scrambled 
puzzle pieces of a lion on an 8 1/2 x 11 In. (22 x 28 cm) sheet of yellow 
paper. The task again is to mentally unscramble the picture and guess 
what picture the puzzle pieces make when correctly combined. 
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The eighth task (shape-blocks) consists of six red wooden inch-cubes 
arranged in a vertical rectangular pattern on a yellow piece of poster 
board. The task is to rearrange it into a 'stair-step' pattern (as shown 
on the poster board) by moving only one block. 
Selective comparison tasks These problems involve insights that 
require the application of old information to new information in the 
problem in a novel way. 
The first task (bread loaf) consists of a small uncut loaf of bread. 
The task Is to figure out how many cuts need to be made on the bread 
(across the width) if the bread had to be cut up into four pieces. 
The second task (ribbon) consists of a piece of red ribbon measuring 
18 in. (46 cm) in length. The task is to find out how many pieces of 
ribbon there would be in total if the ribbon were cut (across the width) 
in two different places with a pair of scissors. 
The third task (taped-strlps) consists of four 6 1/2 x 2 1/2 In. (16 
1/2 X 6 cm) strips of colored construction paper. The task is to figure 
out how many pieces of tape are needed to tape the pieces one after 
another to make one long strip. 
The selective comparison problems are Introduced only after the 
subjects have understood the example problem that is used as a basis for 
transfer of knowledge to these new Insight tasks. The example problem 
consists of a 3 1/2 X 1 1/2 in. (9 x 4 cm) block of wood with a line 
drawn around it, and two smaller blocks each measuring half the length of 
the larger block. The subject's task Is to figure out how many cuts need 
to be made on the larger block to get two pieces. 
24 
All the problems that use poster boards or sheets of paper were 
laminated to enhance appearance and Increase durability. During the 
administration of the insight tasks, the administrator used a one page 
score sheet to record the responses of the subjects. 
Intelligence measure 
The Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT; Dunn & Markwardt, 
1970) was used to measure the intellectual ability of all the subjects in 
the study. This test was selected because of its high correlations with 
measures of Intelligence. 
Procedure 
Permission to conduct this research was first sought from the Iowa 
State University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research. 
Written permission was then obtained from the principals of the schools 
and from the parents prior to involving any child In the study. 
Children were taken from the classroom to a quiet room In the school 
building for two individually administered sessions, each lasting about 
40-45 minutes. The two sessions occurred approximately one week apart. 
All subjects first received the insight problems and then the PIAT. 
Rapport was established with each child with friendly conversation before 
the testing sessions. 
During the insight testing session, subjects were not allowed to 
physically manipulate the experimental objects while working on the 
problem. This was done to ensure that the solution was not reached 
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accidentally through manipulation. In all cases, the subjects were 
encouraged to figure out the problem, and the experimenter said "Good" In 
response to any answer, right or wrong. The experimenter Introduced the 
Insight problems as follows: "We are going to play some tricky games, are 
you ready for them?" The experimenter then showed the "IIon-puzzle" 
problem and said, "Look at this. What do you think this could be a 
picture of?" 
The experimenter showed the "ship-puzzle" task and said, "Look at 
this picture and tell me what you think this could be?" 
The "chlpmunk-acorn" task was presented to the subject and the 
experimenter explained, "This little girl went out Into the woods and 
found pretty leaves and birds and trees and stones and acorns and a 
chipmunk (pointing to each in turn)! She liked the chipmunk so much that 
she wanted to take it home. So she caught the chipmunk and put it in her 
box, like this (lifting the chipmunk and placing it on the felt box). 
Now this box had teeny little holes In it for the chipmunk to breathe. 
Then she saw this stone and thought, ''Oh, what a pretty stone; I want to 
take this home for my rock collection and she put the stone into her box. 
Then she saw the acorn and thought, want to take this home for my 
collection', and she put the acorn into her box too. Now she had three 
things in her box! She picked up the box and carried It carefully home. 
When she got home she opened her box and one of the three things was 
missing from her box! Now which one of the three things do you think 
could have been missing from her box?" 
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For the "pointing-blocks" task the subject was told, "These blocks 
are pointing this way (pointing towards the apex of the triangular 
pattern), Just like this (pointing to a drawing of the pattern on the 
board). I want you to think of a way to make these blocks point the 
other way (pointing towards the base of the pattern). Just like this 
(pointing to a drawing of the pattern on the board). But you can move 
only two blocks." The subjects were reminded not to touch the blocks 
until they thought they had an Idea. 
The experimenter showed the "shape-blocks" task and said, "Okay! 
Let's try a different one. See this pattern! I want you to make these 
blocks look like this (pointing to a stair-step pattern drawing on the 
board) by moving only one block." 
The experimenter proceeded to the "bald-grandpa" task and said, "This 
time I want you to listen to me: my grandpa went out for a walk one day 
and he got caught In the rain. He didn't have a hat or an umbrella and 
his clothes got completely wet, but, he dldnt get any wet hair on his 
head. How can that be?" 
The "alternate-glasses" task was described as follows: "You have 
three full-glasses on this side and three empty-glasses on this side 
(pointing). I would like you to think of a way to arrange these glasses 
Into a pattern of full-glass empty-glass, full-glass empty-glass, 
full-glass empty-glass, so that every other glass Is full and every other 
glass Is empty. Okay? But I will let you move only one glass! Again, 
dont touch the glasses. Just look at them and think In your mind, and 
when you have an Idea you can tell me and then try It out." 
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The experimenter showed the *squares-in-grId' task, and said, "How 
many squares can you find In this figure." 
The "snack-table" task was Introduced by saying, "Here you find four 
children — A, B, C, and D. This Is A for Amy, this Is B for Bob, C for 
Cindy, and D for Danny (pointing at each). There Is a problem here. 
These children have to sit together at the snack table to have snack, but 
they are fighting because they want to sit next to their friends. Both C 
and D, Cindy and Danny, are fighting to sit next to A, Amy; and B, Bob 
says dont want to sit next to C, Cindy.' What a problem! Now you have 
to find a way to help them sit together with their friends so that they 
stop fighting and are happy again." 
For the "block-ln-bottle" task Instructions began, "Here is a Jar 
with a wood block inside. We'll pretend that the bottom of this bottle 
is stuck to the tray, so you cant lift the bottle and take out the block 
like this (demonstrating by tilting the bottle and letting the block roll 
out). Here on the tray you have a plpecleaner, a popslcle stick, a twist 
tie, a piece of thread, a pair of tweezers and sane water. Dont touch 
anything; Just think of a good way to get this block out from the Jar by 
using only one of these things. When you have an Idea you can tell me." 
The "crackers" task was introduced to the subject by saying, "Here we 
have five crackers in one line: one-two-three-four-fIve (counting aloud). 
You have to think of a way to arrange these crackers In two straight 
lines, with three crackers In each line." 
The instructions for the "candy-balloon" task began, "Sally had nine 
pieces of candy (pointing to the candy at the top of the poster board). 
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She wanted to trade some of her candy for balloons. For every one piece 
of gum that she traded In, she got two balloons; for every one piece of 
chocolate candy that she traded In, she got one balloon: and for every 
one piece of tangy candy that she traded In, she got three balloons 
(pointing to each In turn). How much would she get If she sold two 
pieces of gum?" 
The "driver-of-car* task was explained, "This is a white and red car, 
and you are the driver of the car (indicating the empty driver's seat). 
These children are going for a ride to the zoo. This boy is wearing a 
white shirt and green pants, this girl is wearing a blue dress, and this 
little girl is wearing a red dress, and there is a doggy riding in the 
back too (pointing to each). Now tell me, what Is the driver of the car 
wearing?" 
The instructions for the "cat-rabbit-carrots" task were as follows: 
"This boy had to carry his pet cat, his pet rabbit, and a big bag of 
carrots into his house. But he could take only one at a time Into his 
house. He could not leave his cat alone with his bunny because the cat 
would eat his bunny (pointing to the prohibited cat-bunny combination); 
he could not leave his bunny alone with the carrots because the bunny 
would eat up his carrots (pointing to the prohibited bunny-carrots 
combination). How do you think this boy should bring them into his house 
one at a time. When you think of an idea you can tell me and I'll move 
these for you." 
The selective comparison example problem was demonstrated to the 
subject. It was only after the subject had understood the nature of the 
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example problem that the test problems were Introduced. The test 
problems required the same solution procedure as the example, but It was 
believed that they could only be solved If the subjects recognized that 
the Information from the previous example problem could be used to solve 
the current problems. 
The first selective ccnqparlson "bread-loaf" task was presented as 
follows: "Here Is a loaf of bread. If you had to cut this bread Into 
four pieces like this (a back and forth slicing motion was made above the 
bread), how many cuts would you have to make on the bread?" 
The Instructions for the "ribbon" task began, "This Is a little 
girl's ribbon. She got tired of having It so long, so one day she took a 
pair of scissors and went 'snip-snip' two times (accompanied with a 
snipping motion above ribbon). How many pieces of ribbon did she end up 
with altogether?" 
The "taped-pleces" task was described as follows, "Here are four 
pieces of construction paper. Suppose I asked you to tape these pieces 
together one after the other to make one long strip, how many pieces of 
tape would you need to make one long strip?" 
Instructions were repeated as often as necessary, and the subjects 
were encouraged to think about these tricky questions. When the subject 
was not able to provide the correct response or solution, the subject was 
told, "Okay, I'll give you a little clue that might help you with this 
tricky problem." The relevant cue was then Introduced and the subject 
encouraged to solve the problem. The cues incorporated the particular 
kind of insight needed to facilitate problem solution. 
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The cues In the series of selective encoding tasks pointed out the 
information that was relevant for problem solution. In the 
"block-in-bottle" task, for instance, the importance of the ^water^ for 
problem solution was pointed out to the subject. In the series of 
selective combination tasks, the subject was cued either on the location 
of one or two of the items that needed to be combined, or was cued on how 
to organize the relevant information. In the "pointing-blocks" task, for 
instance, the subject was shown the two blocks that needed to moved and 
placed elsewhere. The cues In the selective comparison tasks involved 
explicitly pointing out that the previously acquired Information was 
relevant for current problem solution. The cue In the "loaf-bread" task, 
for instance, involved a repeat demonstration of the example problem 
while clearly pointing out to the subject that it would help him/her with 
the current problem. 
The PIAT was administered by the experimenter and a trained graduate 
student generally within a week of the insight testing session. Each 
child was seen Individually, and the test required an average of 30 
minutes for completion. 
Scoring procedure 
Children were assigned a score of 3, 2 or 1 on each of the 17 insight 
tasks. A score of three indicated a correct solution; a score of two 
indicated a corrrect solution after presentation of the cue; and a score 
of one indicated an incorrect solution after presentation of the cue. A 
child could thus achieve a total score ranging between 17 and 51 points. 
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with 51 representing a perfect score (correct solutions without cues) 
all Items. 
PIAT Total and subtest raw scores were used for all correlational 
analyses while normalized standard score conversions from percentile 
ranks, derived from PIAT total scores, were used for all analyses of 
variance to enable group comparisons. 
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RESULTS 
Internal Structure 
Table 1 presents descriptive information concerning the distribution 
of children's responses to each of the 17 insight items. For each task 
the mean score and standard deviation is also presented. The possible 
score range for each task is one to three, with three representing a 
perfect score; the corresponding range for the total score is 17 to 51, 
with 51 representing a perfect score. In the present sample, total 
insight scores ranged from 22 to 47, with a mean score of 34.57 and a 
standard deviation of 5.88. The mean of all the task means was found to 
be 2.15 while the standard deviation equalled 0.75. There Is some 
variability in performance across tasks (Encoding 2, Combination 1 and 6, 
and Comparison 2) which is possibly a function of task complexity. 
Reliability 
Chronbach's alpha was calculated for the 17 insight tasks to provide 
an index of the internal consistency of the scale and it equalled .76. A 
corrected item-total correlation for each of the 17 tasks was computed 
and the coefficients are shown in Table 2. Also included are the alpha 
values for the scale if a task was deleted. 
The reliability coefficients for the three subscales—Total Encoding 
(six items), Total Combination (eight items). Total Ccnqparison (three 
items)—were also computed since they were believed to tap three distinct 
though related kinds of insight skills. Their alpha coefficients were 
low and equalled .52, .59 and .66 respectively. These low coefficients 
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Table 1. Percentages of types of responses to Insight tasks (a = 107) 
Solved 
spontaneously 
Solved 
with cue 
Not 
solved 
Mean 
Score 
SO 
ECl 22.4 23.4 54.2 1.68 0.82 
EC2 3.7 4.7 91.6 1.12 0.43 
EC3 36.4 16.8 46.7 1.90 0.91 
EC4 46.7 28.0 25.2 2.22 0.82 
EC5 32.7 20.6 46.7 1.86 0.88 
EC6 45.8 8.4 45.8 2.00 0.96 
CBl 87.9 10.3 1.9 2.86 0.40 
CB2 16.8 39.3 43.9 1.72 0.73 
CB3 65.4 25.2 9.3 2.56 0.66 
CB4 29.0 44.9 26.2 2.03 0.75 
CB5 17.8 35.5 46.7 1.71 0.75 
CB6 0.9 21.5 77.6 1.23 0.45 
CB7 68.2 16.8 15.0 2.53 0.74 
CB8 59.8 24.3 15.9 2.44 0.76 
CPl 45.8 15.0 39.3 2.06 0.92 
CP2 74.8 11.2 14.0 2.60 0.72 
CP3 47.7 7.5 44.9 2.03 0.97 
Note. EC = Selective Encoding task; CB = Selective Combination task; CP 
= Selective Comparison task. 
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Table 2. Reliability analysis of Individual Insight Items 
ECl 
EC2 
EC3 
EC4 
EC5 
EC6 
CBl 
CB2 
CB3 
CB4 
CBS 
CB6 
CB7 
CB8 
CPl 
CP2 
CP3 
Corrected Item-total 
correlation 
.23 
.32 
.32 
.22 
.36 
.43 
.10 
.37 
.36 
.42 
.35 
.10  
.23 
.49 
.58 
.32 
.48 
Alpha if 
Item deleted 
.76 
.75 
.75 
.76 
.74 
.74 
.76 
.74 
.74 
.74 
.74 
.76 
.75 
.73 
.72 
.75 
.73 
Note. EC » Selective Encoding task; CB = Selective Combination task; CP = 
Selective Comparison task. 
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may be a function of the low numbers of tasks comprising each of the 
subscales. Cronbach's alpha for the PIAT was established at .89. 
Inter-item correlations 
Inter-task correlations were calculated to assess whether Inter-Item 
correlations within each of the three subgroups of Insight tasks were 
higher than the Inter-Item correlations across the three subgroups of 
Insight tasks, and thereby test the convergent and discriminant validity 
of the three Insight measures. The results of the correlational analyses 
are displayed in Appendix A. In terms of Inter-Item correlations within 
task subgroups, results for the Encoding tasks show that of the 15 
possible paired combinations of Individual Encoding tasks, only six (40%) 
were significantly correlated, while four coefficients approached but did 
not reach significance. After age was partial led out, the number of 
significant coefficients dropped to five (33%)* Among the Combination 
subgroup, 15 of the 28 possible correlation coefficients (54%) were 
significant. The number of significant correlation coefficients dropped 
to nine (32%) after the effect of age was removed. All three Comparison 
tasks were significantly Intercorrelated (100%), before and after 
partial ling out age. 
When examining inter-item correlations across the subgroups, results 
showed that 20 of the 48 (42%) correlation coefficients between the 
Encoding and Combination tasks were significant, with 12 (25%) remaining 
significant after age was partial led out. Of the 18 correlation 
coefficients between Encoding and Comparison tasks, seven (39%) were 
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found to be significant, which dropped to three (17%) after age was 
partial led out. Of the 24 correlation coefficients between Combination 
and Comparison tasks, 13 (54%) were found to be significant, which 
dropped to eight (33%) after age was partial led out. The pattern of 
Inter-item correlations within and across the three task subgroups failed 
to provide unequivocal evidence to support the existence of three 
distinct but related Insight skills. 
Factor analvaia 
To examine the Interrelationship between the 17 Insight items In a 
more concise manner, the Items were subjected to a principal-components 
factor analysis. The number of factors to be extracted was determined by 
Kaiser's eigenvalue criterion. Using these criteria, five unrotated 
factors emerged which accounted for 51.7% of the variance. The Insight 
Items and their respective factor loadings are presented in Table 3. As 
can be seen in the table, 10 of the 17 Insight Items—Encoding 5, 6, 
Combination 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and Comparison 1, 2, and 3 loaded highly on 
the first factor which accounted for 21.5% of the total variance. Four 
Insight Items—Encoding 4, Combination 1, 6 and 7 had the highest 
loadings on the second factor, which accounted for 9% of the total 
variance. Only one Item each loaded highly on the third, fourth, and 
fifth factors which accounted for 7.7%, 6.9% and 6.6% of the total 
variance respectively. 
The factor structure obtained for the 17 tasks did not reflect the 
theoretically generated distinct component insight skills of selective 
encoding, selective combination and selective comparison. It Indicated 
37 
Table 3. Factor structure of Insight scale 
Factor loadings 
I II III IV V 
Eigenvalues 3.65 1.54 1.30 1.18 1.13 
ECl .32 -.10 -.28 .56 -.39 
EC2 .42 .01 -.45 -.22 .09 
EC3 .42 .22 .13 -.03 .54 
EC4 .30 .55 -.28 -.25 -.12 
ECS .47 .08 -.39 -.07 -.29 
EC6 .55 -.16 -.44 -.01 -.20 
CBl .15 -44 .24 .36 .38 
CB2 .47 .24 .33 .07 - .25 
CB3 .46 .25 .02 .43 .15 
CB4 .56 .05 .29 .15 -.14 
CB5 .45 .22 .02 .17 .30 
CB6 .14 .64 .39 -.17 -.10 
CB7 .33 -.42 .37 -.19 -.21 
CB8 .62 .02 .17 .21 -.18 
CPl .72 -.19 .04 -.34 -.10 
CP2 .43 -.25 .09 -.28 .31 
CP3 .62 -.29 .01 -.27 -.11 
Note. EC = Selective Encoding task; CB = Selective Combination task; CP 
= Selective Comparison task. 
rather the existence of a primary factor that was clearly distinct from 
the other four factors In terms of the numbers of Items with high 
loadings on It, and the total variance accounted for by It (see Appendix 
B for scree plot of eigenvalues). Given the reliability of the total 
scale and the amount of variance accounted for by the-first factor on 
which all but two tasks had loadings that were equal to or greater than 
.30, and the fact that little support was found for a differentiated 
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construct of Insight, all the Insight tasks were combined to create a 
total Insight score for subsequent analyses. 
Sex and Age Effects 
Correlational analvgea 
Correlational analyses were performed in order to investigate the 
relationships between sex, age and grade and performance on Insight 
tasks; the correlational data for the individual tasks and for the total 
Insight score are presented in Table 4. An inspection of the table shows 
both age and grade to be significantly correlated with the same Insight 
tasks with the exception of one task (Combination 1) which correlated 
slightly with age but not with grade. A significant correlation was 
found between age and the total Insight score (£ = .52, £<.001>, and 
between grade and the total Insight score (c • .51, &<.001>. Age and 
grade were found to be highly correlated with each other (c = .82, 
C<.001). No statistically significant correlation was found between sex 
and the total Insight score <£ = -.01, £>.05>. 
ftnalvala of variance 
A three-way analysis of variance was performed to examine differences 
in the total Insight score as a function of sex, grade and school (see 
Table 5). The analyses did not reveal any significant main or 
interaction effects attributable to sex differences or differences among 
the schools from which the sample was drawn. A significant main effect 
for grade was found for the total Insight score, £(1, 103) = 21.19, 
£<.001. The first grade children achieved significantly higher scores 
Table 4. Correlations between Insight tasks, sex, age, grade and PIAT 
scores 
AGE GRADE SEX PHA 
ECl .12 .11 .09 .25** 
EC2 .36*** .35*** -.17* .39*** 
EC3 .24** .31*** .02 .25** 
EC4 .13 .14 -.10 .22* 
ECS .21* .30*** -.00 .47*** 
EC6 .44*** .36*** -.14 .45*** 
CBl .20* .12 .09 .09 
CB2 .11 .15 -.04 .28** 
CB3 .21* .25** .14 .31*** 
CB4 .25** .21* .09 .28** 
CBS .26** .23** -.06 .31*** 
CB6 -.10 .03 .16 .12 
CB7 .11 .01 .07 .11 
CB8 .35*** .26** -.00 .41*** 
CPl .36*** .36*** .03 .49*** 
CP2 .15 .05 .01 .23** 
CP3 .49*** .52*** .03 .51*** 
TIN .52*** .51*** -.01 .69*** 
Note. EC = Selective Encoding task; CB = Selective Combination task; CP 
= Selective Comparison task; PNA = PIAT math subtest; PRR = PIAT reading 
recognition subtest ; PRC = PIAT reading comprehension subtest; PSP » PIAT 
spelling subtest ; P6I = PIAT general information; TPT = Overall PIAT 
score; TIN = Total Insight score. 
* B<,05. 
** S<.01. 
*#* B<.001. 
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PRR PRC PSP P6I TPT 
.06 .04 .07 .26** .17* 
,23** .30*** .26** .43*** .39*** 
,22* .11 .17* .19* .23** 
,12 .15 .04 .19* .17* 
,36*** .37*** .32*** .44*14 .47*** 
.35*** .39*** .32*** .45*** .47*** 
,16 .18* .14 .10 .16* 
.10 .09 .08 .21* .19* 
.21* .23** .19* .14 .25** 
19 .18* .19* .34*** .28** 
.26** .26** .14 .26** .30*** 
12 .13 .10 .07 .13 
08 .10 .08 .24** .15 
29*** .27** .29*** .39*** .40*** 
45*** .37*** .36*** .31*** .48*** 
17* .09 .04 .21* .18* 
58*** .56*** .52*** .28*** .58*** 
53*** .51*** .44*** .60*** .67*** 
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on the Insight tasks (U > 36.69) than the kindergarten children (U = 
31.93). None of the interaction effects, however, was significant. 
Insight Skills and Intelligence 
In order to examine the hypothesis that insight skills are an 
important component of intelligence and that they differentiate the more 
from the less intelligent, correlational analyses were performed, as a 
first step, between insight skills and intelligence, as measured by the 
PIAT. The results are presented in Table 4. Since earlier analyses had 
revealed no sex differences, separate correlation coefficients were not 
Table 5. Analysis of variance for total insight score 
Source df Mean Square F 
Sex (A) 1 31.61 1.15 
Grade (B) 1 563.76 21.19*** 
School (C) 2 10.06 0.37 
A X B 1 10.60 0.54 
A X C 2 33.60 0.30 
B X C 2 1.00 0.96 
A X B X C 2 13.72 0.61 
*** EL<>001. 
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computed for each sex. As can be seen In Table 4, a significant positive 
correlation was found between the total PIAT score and the total Insight 
score (£ » .67, fi<.001>. First-order (age/grade partial led out) and 
second-order (age and sex partial led out) correlations were calculated 
between the total Insight score and Intelligence. The first-order 
correlation coefficient was .51, £<.001 (same for age and grade), while 
the second-order correlation coefficient was .52, £<.001. An additional 
analysis with percentile rank PIAT scores rather than raw PIAT scores 
produced similar results (£ = .51, £<.001). The results indicate a 
strong positive relationship between intelligence and performance on 
insight tasks. Interestingly, the total Insight score had the highest 
correlations with the PIAT math and the general information subtests (c = 
.69, p<.001; and £ » .60, £<.001 respectively), while it had lower 
correlations with the PIAT reading recognition, comprehension and 
1 
spelling subtests (.53, .51, and .44 respectively). A similar pattern of 
correlations was found for most of the individual insight tasks. 
To further analyze the relationship between intelligence and Insight 
skills, normalized standard score conversions from percentile ranks were 
used to identify three groups of children: high, average and low ability. 
High ability children (U = 28) were defined as those receiving scores 
that were one standard deviation above the mean. Average ability 
children (M = 59) were defined as those receiving scores that were 
between the mean and one standard deviation above the mean. Low ability 
children <U = 20) were defined as those receiving scores that were below 
the mean. The three ability groups were compared with each other in 
43 
terms of performance on the Insight tasks, using a one-way analysis of 
variance procedure. Results indicated a significant difference beween 
the three groups, £ (2,104) = 12.81, &<.001. Planned a priori 
comparisons of the means of the three ability groups revealed that low 
ability children had a significantly lower total Insight score (U = 
29.56) than the average ability children (U = 34.97), 1(104) > 4.16, 
B<.001, and the high ability children (tf = 37.32), i(104) = -4.99, 
&<.001. The mean total Insight score of the average ability and high 
ability children were not significantly different from each other. These 
data support the hypothesis that average and higher ability children 
perform better on insight problems than lower ability children. 
To investigate If more intelligent children tended to spontaneously 
solve the Insight problems, while less intelligent children experienced 
greater difficulty in producing the Insights spontaneously, a one-way 
analysis of variance was conducted on the number of spontaneously solved 
tasks, out of a total of 17 tasks. The analysis produced significant 
differences between the three groups, £ (2,104) = 10.80, £<.001. Planned 
a priori comparisons between the three ability groups indicated that the 
mean score of 8.39 for the high ability children and the mean score of 
7.17 for the average ability children were both significantly higher than 
the mean score of 4.65 for the low ability children, 1(104) = 4.61, 
K<.001, and 1(104) » -3.51, &<.001 respectively. The mean scores of the 
high ability and average ability children, however, were not 
significantly different from each other. The results confirmed the 
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hypothesis that average and higher ability children spontaneously solved 
more problems than lower ability children. 
Effectlvenesss of Cues 
To Investigate the effectiveness of cues In the facilitation of 
problem solution, children who failed to provide the correct solution 
spontaneously were given cues that Included éléments of the particular 
Insight needed to solve the problem. The percentage of children solving 
Insight tasks after being given a cue and the percentage of children 
unable to solve the tasks after being given a cue was computed for each 
task, and Is presented In Table 6. The table shows some variability In 
the effectiveness of the cues In producing a successful response over the 
17 different tasks. Cues appear to be more successful with seme tasks 
(e.g., Encoding 4, Combination 1, 3, 4, and 8) than with other tasks 
(e.g.. Encoding 2, 6, Combination 6, and Comparison 3). This difference 
In effectiveness may be a function of task difficulty and familiarity. 
In order to examine the facultative effects of cues across all 17 tasks, 
a proportion score (the probability of success after receiving a cue) was 
computed for each child. This proportion score equalled the number of 
successful responses after receiving a cue divided by the number of 
successful and unsuccessful responses after receiving a cue. These 
scores ranged from .00 to .77, with a mean of .37 and a standard 
deviation of .18. This indicates that on an average, each child had a 
37% likelihood of successfully solving the task after receiving a cue. 
45 
Table 6. Percentage of subjects succeeding and failing on insight tasks 
after receiving cues 
% Successful % Unsuccessful 
ECl 30.1 69.9 
EC2 4.9 95.1 
EC3 26.5 73.5 
EC4 52.6 47.4 
ECS 30.6 69.4 
EC6 15.5 84.5 
CBl 84.6 15.4 
CB2 47.2 52.8 
CB3 73.0 27.0 
CB4 63.2 36.8 
CB5 43.2 56.8 
CB6 21.7 78.3 
CB7 52.9 47.1 
CB8 60.5 39.5 
CPl 27.6 72.4 
CP2 44.4 55.6 
CP3 14.3 85.7 
Note. EC = Selective Encoding task; CB = Selective Combination task; CP 
> Selective Comparison task. 
[ • 
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To explore the effectiveness of cues as a function of intelligence, 
sex and age, correlational analyses were computed. A moderate, positive 
and significant relationship was found between the probability of success 
after receiving a cue and intelligence (£ = .33, £<.001 with PIAT scores; 
and £ • .35, £<.001 with PIAT percentile rank scores). A less 
significant relationship was found between the probability of success 
after receiving a cue and age (c » .21, £<.05). No relationship, 
however, was found between sex and the probability of success after a cue 
(£ > -.05, £>.05). A first-order correlation (age partial led out) 
between the probability of success after a cue and PIAT scores produced a 
slightly lower though still significant correlation (£ > .26, £<.01). 
A 3 (intellectual ability) x 2 (sex) x 2 (grade) analysis of variance 
was performed to further examine the facultative effects of cues. 
Results indicated a significant main effect for intellectual ability, 
£(2, 91) = 4.87, £<.01, and for grade, £(1, 91) = 11.07, £<.001, but not 
for sex (see Table 7). All interactions were nonsignificant. Planned a 
priori comparisons of the means for the three ability groups indicated 
that the hlg^ ability children (M = .41) and the average ability children 
(M = .39) had significantly greater success in solving problems after 
receiving cues than the low ability children (U » .26), 1(104) = -2.88, 
£<.01, and 1(104) = -2.97. £<.01 respectively. The average ability and 
the high ability groups did not differ significantly from each other. It 
appears then that cues, when needed, were more effectively and 
successfully used by the average and the higher ability children than by 
47 
the lower ability children, and more successfully and effectively used by 
the first graders than by the kindergarteners. 
Table 7. Analysis of variance for probability of success after receiving 
Cues 
Source df Mean Square F 
Intelligence (A) 2 0.12 4.87** 
Sex (B> 1 0.02 0.71 
Grade (C) 1 0.28 11.07*** 
A X B 2 0.01 0.29 
A X C 2 0.03 1.20 
B X C 1 0.01 0.47 
A X B X C 2 0.04 1.74 
** £<.01. 
*** &<.001. 
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DISCUSSION 
In an effort to provide an ecologically more valid conceptualization 
of intelligence, Sternberg (1985) proposed the triarchic theory of human 
intelligence. This theory has three components. The experiential 
subthebry proposes that a task measures intelligence to the extent that 
it requires the ability to deal with novel kinds of task and situational 
demands and/or the ability to automatize information processing. So far, 
however, only the ability to deal with novel tasks has been subjected to 
enqpirical verification. Insight is projected in the experiential 
subtheory as playing a major role In Intelligent behavior. Sternberg 
postulates that insight is made up of three separate though related 
psychological processes, and that it can be assessed through novel kinds 
of tasks that require a fair amount of insight for correct solution, but 
little in the way of prior academic knowledge. Two studies (Davidson & 
Sternberg, 1984; Sternberg & Davidson, 1982) using such novel tasks have 
been conducted to provide empirical support for the subtheory that 
insight skills provide an important source of individual differences in 
intelligence, and a theoretically sound basis for understanding 
intelligent performance. Results of these research studies, using adults 
and older children (fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-graders), supported 
Sternberg's three-process view of insight. The insights of selective 
encoding, selective combination and selective comparison were found to 
play an important role in the solution of insight tasks, and in 
differentiating the performance of highly intelligent Individuals from 
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that of average Individuals. Moreover, highly Intelligent children were 
reported to benefit very little from cueing of the Insights since they 
tended to produce the Insights required to solve the Insight problems 
spontaneously; In contrast, the less Intelligent children were reported 
to profit from the cueing because they had difficulty producing the 
required Insights on their own. 
The present study was designed to examine the relationship between 
psychometric Intelligence and performance on Insight tasks In young 
children. In particular, this study Investigated whether Insight skills 
as measured by insight tasks distinguished the more intelligent young 
children from the less intelligent young children, and whether the more 
intelligent young children tended to spontaneously produce the Insights 
needed for problem solution while the less intelligent young children 
were less able to solve the problems spontaneously. This study also 
examined if cues would be more effective in facilitating insightful 
solutions for the less intelligent young children than for the more 
intelligent young children. Additionally, sex differences in performance 
on Insight tasks were explored. 
Reliability and Validity 
The insight tasks used In the present study were developed to tap the 
three separate processes of insight: selective encoding, selective 
combination and selective comparison. Results indicated that the pattern 
of intercorrelations among the insight tasks did not show the expected 
correlational pattern to indicate convergent and discriminant validity 
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for the three Insight skills, that Is, with higher intertask correlations 
within each of the three subgroups and lower Intertask correlations 
across the three subgroups of Insight tasks. A factor analysis confirmed 
this lack of factorial distinctiveness of the theoretically based 
component insight skills. Part of the reason for this lack of construct 
validity evidence could well be the relatively low internal consistency 
coefficients for the selective encoding tasks, the selective combination 
tasks and the selective comparison tasks. The low alpha coefficients 
. undoubtedly resulted from the low numbers of tasks within each subscale. 
Given the reliability of the total scale and the results of the factor 
analysis, and the lack of support for the existence of three distinct but 
related kinds of insights, all the insight tasks were treated as 
measuring a unidimensional skill. 
Sex Differences 
No specific predictions regarding sex differences were made since sex 
I 
differences in insight skills in children have not been explored. Of the 
few studies that have addressed sex differences In Insight skills using 
adults, only one reported an overall significant difference in 
performance with males scoring higher than females on five insight tasks 
(Maier & Casselman, 1970a). Another study (Jacobs & Oominowski, 1981) 
focused on mean solution times for problem solution and reported that 
males had significantly lower solution times on insight tasks than 
females. In the current study using six- and seven-year-olds, no 
significant correlations between sex and performance on the 17 individual 
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Insight tasks were found. An analysis of variance examining the effect 
of sex on the total Insight score also failed to show a significant 
effect of sex. The results did not indicate that the boys and girls 
differed systematically In their performance on the insight tasks. 
Moreover, no sex differences were found in the ability to use cues 
effectively for problem solution. 
Age Differences 
Age as a factor in differential performance on Insight tasks has not 
been addressed in previous studies, where research saisies consisted 
mostly of college students (Burke & Naler, 1965; Jacobs & Ocminowski, 
1981; Naler & Casselman, 1970a, 1970b; Welsberg & Alba, 1981). The one 
study that did investigate insight skills in older children did not 
report age effects (Davidson & Sternberg, 1984). 
The findings of the present study showed that the total Insight score 
correlated with age and with grade, with age and grade being highly 
intercorrelated. An ANOVA examining the effects of grade on the total 
Insight score revealed a significant grade effect for the insight tasks. 
This result is not surprising since it may reasonably be assumed that 
children would become more competent at nearly every kind of task 
including insight tasks as they increased in age, with older children 
being more proficient than younger children. It should be noted here, 
that although the insights needed to solve the insight tasks used in this 
study did not require specialized academic knowledge or training, they 
did rely to some extent on previously acquired knowledge and experience. 
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For Instance, a child would need to have some awareness of the concept of 
'baldness' (a concept that may be acquired with growing experience), to 
be able to generate the Insight needed for the solution of Encoding 3 
(Bald-grandpa). 
Insight Skills and Psychometric Intelligence 
The results of this study regarding the role of Insight skills In 
Intelligence were In general consistent with evidence provided by 
Sternberg (1982) and Davidson (1986). Insight skills as measured by the 
Insight tasks were found to be substantially correlated with psychometric 
intelligence as measured by the PIAT. An analysis of variance also 
supported the hypothesis that children who are psychometrlcally more 
intelligent are above average in terms of insight skills, by showing that 
high and average ability children achieved significantly higher scores on 
the insight tasks than lower ability children. High and average ability 
children were also found to spontaneously solve more insight problems 
than children of lower ability. 
In relation to the question regarding the effectiveness of cueing on 
problem solution, it was found that cues had a facultative effect on the 
production of correct solutions on the insight tasks, but that they 
appeared to be differentially effective for different tasks and different 
children. The differential success of the cues across the different 
tasks may likely be related to the degree of complexity and novelty of 
the tasks. Cues were found to be more effective and successful for the 
average and high ability children than for the low ability children. 
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This finding appears to contradict Davidson's (1986) claim that children 
of average intellectual ability profit more from cueing than higher 
ability children, since higher ability children tend to solve insight 
problems spontaneously. One source of the discrepancy between her 
findings and the present data may lie In the methodological differences 
between the two studies. Davidson compared the performance of high and 
low ability groups on cued and noncued tasks. Upon finding a 
significantly higher success rate on the cued versus the noncued tasks 
for the low ability but not for the high ability children, it was 
concluded that high ability children did not profit from cues since they 
tended to have the Insights spontaneously. In the current study, on the 
other hand, cues were provided to all children after they had failed to 
produce the insights spontaneously, and it was found that cues had a 
greater facultative effect for the high and average ability children 
than for the low ability children. In other words, although the more 
Intelligent children tended to solve more Insight tasks spontaneously and 
therefore needed fewer cues to facilitate problem solution than the lower 
ability children (consistent with Davidson's finding), they also 
benefited more from the cues when provided to them by using them more 
successfully and effectively than the less intelligent children. This 
finding seems to tie In with Maler's assertion (1970) that a cue is 
effective only if a subject can use It appropriately, which depends as 
much on the cue as on the subject's knowledge and ability. 
Thus, the results of this study can be interpreted as supporting 
Sternberg's subtheory of the role of insight skills in individual 
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differences In intelligence. In view of the current efforts to broaden 
the base of Intellectual assessment and move away from 10, insight 
skills, which are less dependent on academically taught skills, do offer 
a supplementary way to understand and measure Individual differences In 
intelligence and can serve an important role in the development of 
improved theories of Intellectual functioning. In pursuing such research 
however, it would be necessary to develop a greater range of tasks that 
have greater reliability and validity to accurately measure insight 
skills. Future research could investigate the relationship between real 
world success, creative problem solving abilities, significant 
intellectual accomplishments of individuals and insight skills as 
measured by such insight tasks. This would shed further light on the 
status of insight skills as a valid Indicator of intelligence. It would 
also be useful to attempt to design training procedures for developing 
and improving the component insight skills in children and to assess the 
impact of such training on children's Intellectual level as assessed by 
multiple measures of intelligence. 
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APPENDIX A: 
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUAL INSIGHT TASKS 
\ 
Table A 1. Intercorrelatlons among individual insight tasks 
ECl EC2 EC3 EC4 EC5 EC6 CBl CB2 
ECl .08 -.03 .07 .14 .26** .06 .09 
EC2 .04 .08 .21** .25** .25** .05 .02 
EC3 -.06 -.01 — —  .11 .29*** .14 .06 .16 
EC4 .06 .19* .08 — —  .15 .15 -.17* .19* 
EC5 .13 .19* .25** .12 .27** .02 .12 
EC6 .24** .11 .04 .11 .20* .00 .17* 
CBl .04 -.03 .02 -.20* .02 -.10 --- .06 
CB2 .08 -.03 .13 .18* .09 .14 .04 — — —  
CB3 .17* -.02 .16* .12 .18* .08 .01 .20* 
CB4 .18* .09 .16* .02 .07 .02 -.04 .27** 
CBS .08 .09 .17* .17* .07 .08 .10 .14 
CB6 -.07 .04 .16 .24** .01 -.07 -.11 .21* 
CB7 .07 -.01 .04 -.03 -.01 .08 .14 .10 
CB8 .17* .10 .10 .01 .19* .14 .05 .23 
CPl .12 .18* .14 .12 .16 .19* -.02 .24** 
CP2 .01 .11 .14 .03 .12 .08 .07 .05 
CP3 .00 -.03 .03 -.01 .13 .25** .01 .24** 
Note. Correlation coefficients below the diagonal are first-order 
correlations (age partial led out); correlation coefficients above the 
diagonal are zero-order correlations. EC = Selective Encoding task; CB = 
Selective Combination task; CP = Selective Comparison task. 
* B<.05; ** B<.01; *** E<.001. 
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CB3 CB4 CB5 CB6 CB7 CB8 CPl CP2 CP3 
.19 .20* .11 -.08 .08 .19* .15 .03 .06 
.06 .17* .17* -.00 .03 .21** .28** .16 .15 
.21* .21** .22** .13 .07 .18* .21* .17* .14 
.14 .05 .19* .22** -.02 .06 .15 .05 .05 
.22* .12 .12 -.01 .01 .25** .22** .15 .21** 
.16* .13 .18* -.11 .12 .27** .32*** .14 .41*** 
.05 .01 .15 -.13 .16* .11 .05 .10 .11 
.22** .29*** .16* .19* .11 .25** .26** .06 .26** 
mm—m mm 
.22* .23** .10 -.02 .28** .14 .17* .20* 
.17* .20* .09 .16* .40*** .33*** .23** .21* 
.19* .14 — —  .12 .03 .19* .23** .14 .15 
.12 .12 .15 — — —  -.01 .17* .05 -.03 -.02 
.04 .14 -.00 -.00 — — —  .23** .28** .20* .23 
.22* .34*** .11 .22* .21* .35*** .11 .25** 
.07 .26** .15 .10 .26** .26** — — —  .36*** .57*** 
.14 .20* .10 -.02 .19* .06 .34*** --- .23** 
.11 .10 .04 .04 .20* .10 .48*** .18* —  —  —  
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Figure B 1. Scree Plot of Eigenvalues 
